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Abstract
Choices are not only communicated via explicit actions but also passively through inaction.
In this study we investigated how active or passive choice impacts upon the choice process
itself as well as a preference change induced by choice. Subjects were tasked to select a
preference for unfamiliar photographs by action or inaction, before and after they gave valu-
ation ratings for all photographs. We replicate a finding that valuation increases for chosen
items and decreases for unchosen items compared to a control condition in which the
choice was made post re-evaluation. Whether choice was expressed actively or passively
affected the dynamics of revaluation differently for positive and negatively valenced items.
Additionally, the choice itself was biased towards action such that subjects tended to
choose a photograph obtained by action more often than a photographed obtained through
inaction. These results highlight intrinsic biases consistent with a tight coupling of action
and reward and add to an emerging understanding of how the mode of action itself, and not
just an associated outcome, modulates the decision making process.
Introduction
Choosing according to our preferences is an everyday occurrence in our lives. Some choices are
expressed explicitly through action while others are expressed passively by accepting a default
or not altering an existing choice. Interestingly, an xkcd comic titled “Regrets” (http://xkcd.
com/458/) points out that there are more Google hits for “I should have kissed him/her” com-
pared to “I shouldn’t have kissed him/her”. This asymmetry of regret for action and inaction
has been linked to a number of possible explanations and mediating factors including sense of
agency [1], cognitive accessibility [2], and differential mutability [3,4]. Another possible expla-
nation for this effect is that the consequences of actions are revaluated more easily than the
consequences of inaction. In this study we ask how different modes of choice expression, i.e. ac-
tion and inaction, shape the choice process and the following choice-induced preference
change in different valence contexts.
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publish, or preparation of the manuscript.The observation that choices express, but also shape our preferences is a consistent finding
[5]. One paradigm demonstrating how choice affects preferences is the free-choice paradigm
wherein value judgements are gathered on options before and after subjects are forced to choose
one and reject the other option [6,7]. Post choice the chosen option is valued higher than the
unchosen option, a spread seen for hard choices (options the subject initially valued similarly)
but not easy choices (options which the subject initially valued differently). A classical explana-
tion of this finding is that it reflects a reduction of cognitive dissonance [8] where attitudes are
changed to evaluate the current reality more positively. A recent study has highlighted a meth-
odological flaw in the way many studies on choice-induced preference change have been con-
ducted [6]. As all valuations contain noise, chosen items are less likely to decrease in a second
valuation because the choice accesses the same true underlying value. This is strikingly revealed
by a control condition in which a choice is made after the second evaluation, ruling out any
causal influence of the choice on the change in valuation (see Izuma & Murayama [7] for re-
view). However, despite this flaw in the literature recent studies replicated choice-induced pref-
erence change with experimental designs that account for this artefact [9–13].
There are number of reasons to hypothesize that choice and choice-induced preference
change are modulated by action. A recent study [14] reported that the relative value of visually
represented items is enhanced by button presses to a coinciding auditory cue. This‘cue-approach
training’ increased choicepreferencefor otherwise equallyvalueditems and led to a subsequently
increased valuation. Interestingly, this effect was only seen for items with relatively high value.
Additionally, a revaluation effect was driven by a value change induced by the preceding choice,
indicating a specificity of the cue approach training to bias the binary choicebetween two items.
The observation that the effect is only present for high value items points to a specific interaction
of approach with choice and positive value. We believe that this is consistent with a Pavlovian
congruence framework [15], in which button presses are a model for approach behaviour. In-
deed, a coupling of action and reward could affect choice-induced preference change as it has
been linked to dopaminergic circuitry [16,17] and an effect in the striatum [10,18]. Therefore, we
hypothesize a value enhancing effect by action in a context of positive value.
As described in Fig. 1, we adapted a free choice paradigm [9,10,19] to investigate the impact
of approach on choice and choice-induced preference-change. Choice-induced value change is
measured as the rating change between sessions for each item. The difference in this rating
change for chosen and unchosen items (chosen-unchosen spread) reflects choice but also
contains noise [6,7]. To calculate the genuine choice-induced preference change the chosen-
unchosen spread is compared between the two experimental conditions, namely the experi-
mental condition in which choice precedes revaluation and the control condition in which the
choice is made after revaluation [6,7]. Crucially, choice itself was expressed either by action via
button press (Go, as model for approach) or inaction (No Go), allowing us to test whether ap-
proach biases the choice itself and whether revaluation is modulated as a function of how the
choice is expressed (Go or No Go). By conducting the experiment in two independent samples
with a positive or negative valence stimulus set we could also test the hypothesis whether va-
lence had a differential effect on a modulation of value and combined effect with action.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Two groups (positive valence and negative valence stimuli) of 30 subjects participated in the
study. Participants were recruited through a UCL participant pool, were self-reported right-
handers, had normal or corrected to normal vision and were paid for their participation. The
study was approved by the UCL local research ethics committee (PWB/ED/11–10–12b and
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that no competing interests exist.3450/002) and subjects gave informed written consent. To exclude subjects with poor compli-
ance with task instructions subjects with more than 10 missed responses were removed from
the analysis leaving 24 in the first group (4 males, mean age: 21.86) and 27 in the second group
(12 males, mean age: 22.52).
Experimental procedure
The two experimental groups only differed in the stimuli with which they were presented and
what the outcome would be incentivising accurate choice. In the positive valence group, the
pictures comprised diverse colour photographs gathered from various sources on the internet
including landscapes and juvenile animals (note that the images in Fig. 1 were selected for
being free of copy right and were not actually contained in the set used in the experiment). In
the negative valence group images were selected from the IAPS [20] including dangerous ani-
mals, mutilations and depictions of violence.
Fig 1. Experimental Design. The experimental paradigm comprised four distinct sessions. In Rating Session 1 subjects rated all images. These images
were then paired on the basis of matched ratings. In Choice Session 1 subjects could freely choose (by either pressing or not pressing a button) or a
computer chose at random. In Rating Session 2 subject rated all images again while text informed subjects as to what occurred in Choice Session 1. Finally,
in Choice Session 2 the pairs the computer chose beforehand in Choice Session 1 were displayed. Subjects freely chose again by performing or omitting a
button press like in Choice Session 1. This experiment was conducted in two independent samples with two different stimulus sets (positive and negative
valence). Comparing the value change from Rating Session 1 to 2 for chosen and unchosen items before revaluation and after revaluation provided a
measure of choice-induced value change. We tested whether this choice-induced value change was modulated by action or inaction (Go/No Go) and by
valence. The frequency of choice expressed in a response Go or No Go allows us to test for a bias induced by action on choice itself.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0119682.g001
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sion1,RatingSession 2 andChoiceSession 2 (Fig.1).InRating Session 1 subjects werepresented
with 120 different images and asked to express how much they liked the picture on a scale from
1 to 7 with a button press. Subjects were instructed to use the whole range of the scale. Subjects
had to respond within 5 seconds and the image was displayed on the screen for the full 5 seconds
independent of the reaction time. The images were then paired to match liking rating, and ran-
domly allocated to the “Session 1 Choice” or “Session 2 Choice” conditions. Note, that in previ-
ous studies [10,18] some pairs included two stimuli that were of unequal initial rating making
the choice an “easy choice” (because one stimuli was clearly preferred over the other). No choice-
induced preference change was expected for “easy choices” because the choice would not induce
cognitive dissonance.Therefore,thiscondition was usedpreviously ascontrol condition.Howev-
er, in the current study all pairs were matched for initial preferencerating, rendering them all
“hard choices” (or “critical pairs”). The “easy choice” control condition was omitted in the cur-
rent experiment as the crucial control condition is choice after the second rating (rate-rate-
choose) instead of before the second rating (rate-choose-rate; see Izuma & Murayama [7] for re-
view). In Choice Session 1, pairs in the “Session 1 Choice” condition were displayed after the text
“You choose!” was displayed on the screenfor one second. One picture could be chosenby press-
ing the space bar (Go), the other picture could be chosen by not pressing anything (No Go). The
side on which each picture was presented was allocated at random, as was which option was cho-
sen by a Go or No Go response. Subjects had 7 seconds to make the choice and the pictures were
displayed for the full 7 seconds independent of the time of choice. When subjects pressed the
space bar word “chosen” would appear under the chosen option or if they did not press the space
bar the word “chosen” would appear under the chosen option at the end of the choice period for
500ms. If the pair was in the “Session 2 Choice” condition, the message before the trials read
“Computer chooses!” and subjects were instructed to observe the computer making a random
choice. The choice the computer made was flagged by displaying the word “chosen” under the
chosenoption for 500ms. Thiscondition allowedtokeepexposure to images and choiceconstant
and only manipulate whether subjects can attribute the choice to themselves. Note that the dis-
play time of each image was keptconstant independent of subject’s behaviour in both conditions.
A blank screen was displayed between trials for 500 ms. Trials were presented in random order.
Rating Session 2 was identical to Rating Session 1 except that each picture was captioned with
text stating whether the picture was chosen or not chosen by the subject or computer in Choice
Session 1 (e.g. “You chose this.” for images that were chosen in the “Session 1 Choice” condition
or “The computer rejected this.” for images that were rejected by the computer in the “Session 2
Choice” condition, see Izuma et al. [10] for a similar procedure). Note, that for the items in the
“Session 1 Choice” condition subjects were informed about their own choice. This was not possi-
ble for items in “Session 2 Choice”, as subjects have not made a choice yet. Choice Session 2 pre-
sented all pairs in the “Session 2 Choice” condition for subjects to freely chose, identical to the
pairs in the “Session 1 Choice” condition in Choice Session 1. In order to motivate subjects to
make choices that reflect theirpreference, subjects in the positive valence group were told that in
the end one of the choices is going to be chosen at random and implemented in reality and sub-
jects did indeed receive a printout of a picture to take home. Subjects in the negative valence
group were told that they had to look at one picture they chose for three minutes.
Analysis
First, weinvestigated the effects of the control condition, choice, action and stimulus valence on
rating change between the two sessions. For this, the rating change from session 1 to 3 was en-
tered as dependent variable in a 2x2x2x2 mixed ANOVA with within subject factors of Choice
Action & Valence Modulate Choice and Choice-Induced Preference Change
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and a between subject factor of group (positive valence/negative valence). Choice refers to the
choice the subjects made for Session 1 Choice pairs before the second rating session and for Ses-
sion 2 Choice items after the second rating session.The interaction of Choiceand Condition
revealed whether the rating change differed when the choice preceded the second rating (rate-
choose-rate) or did not exceed rating variation due to noise (rate-rate-choose). In other words
the interaction term (Choice by Condition) represents the choice-induced preferencechange.
We then investigated whether this choice-induced preference change was modulated by Action
(Choice x Condition x Action), Valence (Choice x Condition x Valence) or the interaction of the
two (Choice x Condition x Actionx Valence). Toslice the interaction,the interaction term repre-
senting choice-induced value change was analysed with paired t-tests between the Chosen by
Go/Chosen by No Go conditions in both valence groups. We also investigated whether the raw
choice spread (main effect of Choice)was modulated by Action or Valence (Choice x Action and
Choice x Valence). In order to estimate the size of the choice-induced value change without con-
trol condition, the rate-choose-rate condition was analysed in a 2x2 within (Action and Choice)
x2 between (group) design. See S1 File for the data set and S2 File for additional analyses.
Additionally, our paradigm allowed us to test whether there is an intrinsic choice preference
associated with Go or No Go. Pictures are paired with matched ratings and a picture is pre-
sented to be chosen by Go or No Go by virtue of a random allocation. Therefore the frequency
of subject’s choosing to perform a Go or No Go response should be equal. If the ratio of Go
and No Go choices deviates from 1 then this reflects the fact that subjects have an intrinsic
preference to express choice by either action or inaction, which may cause deviation from opti-
mal choice. This was assessed with a one sample t-test against 1 for the ratio of Go and No Go
responses calculated for each subject. A two sample t-test was used to test whether this bias dif-
fers across the two valence groups. To determine whether one group actually rated the pictures
lower, a two sample t-test was used to test the mean of all ratings from one group against the
other. Trials in which subjects failed to respond were excluded from the analysis. Statistical
analysis was carried out with Matlab R2012b and SPSS 19. As the size of the effect of action
and valence on choice-induced value change is not known the sample size was determined be-
forehand based on existing studies on choice-induced preference change and action
[10,16,17,21].
Results
The mean rating of the images given by subjects differed across the two groups and were higher
in the positive valence group (95% CIs 4.14–4.83 vs. 3.13–3.7; t(49) = 4.98, p<.001; 95% CI.
64–1.5). Note that this difference occurred even though subjects were instructed to scale their
ratings relatively to the stimuli in the set and use the whole range of the scale.
As displayed in Fig. 2a, the value change revealed significant enhancements by an image
being chosen by the subject in either the first or second choice session (main effect of Choice F
(1,49) = 342.69, p<.001, partial η
2 = .86). The strong effect of choice is not surprising as it cap-
tures both an enhancement by choice, as well as alignment of choice with the drift of the noise
contained in the initial measurements [6,7]. The crucial comparison is the difference in value
change between the choices that were made before and after the second evaluation. Indeed, we
show that a preference change induced by choice is significantly larger if the choice was made
in Choice Session 1 (rate-choose-rate) compared to Choice Session 2 (rate-rate-choose; Inter-
action of Choice and Condition: F(1,49) = 39.28, p<.001, partial η
2 = .45). This is illustrated by
values being larger than 0 in Fig. 2b. Only considering the choice spread in the rate-choose-rate
condition alone provides an estimate of by how much one would overestimate the choice-
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partial η
2 = .866).
As displayed in Fig. 2b, for items with positive valence, this choice-induced preference
change was stronger when items were selected by choice compared to being selected by passive
inaction (t(23) = 2.13, p = .044; 95% CI. 01-.61). This effect differed significantly from the effect
in the negative valence stimulus set (F(1,49) = 5.82, p = .02, partial η
2 = .11), which went in the
opposite direction (No Go was revaluated insignificantly more positively, t(23) = 1.39, p = .18,
95% CI-.59-.12). As visible in Fig. 2a, the interaction effects involving action and valence are
driven by changes across all conditions, including the Session 2 Choice condition.
Fig 2. Results. a. The Rating change between the two sessions is displayed for the eight conditions
(resulting from the factors Session 1 Choice/Session 2 Choice, Chosen/Unchosen, Go/No Go) in the positive
and negative valence group. There was an effect of Choice (chosen larger than unchosen), that was stronger
in the experimental condition (larger in Session 1 Choice than Session 2 Choice). In the positive valence
group choosing a picture by action led to increased positive choice-induced preference change (defined as
the interaction term of Choice and Condition, see Fig. 2b). This effect was absent in the negative valence
group. Note that the overall interaction effect is driven by differences across all conditions, including the
Session 2 Choice condition. b. To illustrate the overall interaction, the choice-induced preference change
(interaction term of Condition (Session 1 Choice/Session 2 Choice) and Choice (Chosen/Unchosen)) is
displayed for choice made by action and inaction in both groups, resulting in four conditions (Choice by action
in the positive valence group; Choice by inaction in the positive valence group; Choice by action in the
negative valence group; Choice by inaction in the negative valence group). Error bars represent the standard
error of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0119682.g002
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tion of Choice and Valence: F(1,49) = 13.11, p = .001, partial η
2 = .211), yet not the genuine
choice induced-preference change (Interaction of Choice, Condition and Valence interaction:
F(1,49) = 1.84, p = .18, partial η
2 = .036). As visible in Fig. 2a, the tie between choice and value
change (including choice following value change, as in the rate-rate-choose condition) is in-
creased when stimuli have positive valence.
Analysing frequency of choice itself showed that subjects were biased towards choices ob-
tained by Go (mean of the ratio of Go/No Go responses was 1.13+-.38, the size of the bias (de-
viation of the choice-ratio from 1) is significantly larger than zero; t(50) = 2.83, p = .007; 95%
CI. 039-.23) and notably this Go bias did not differ across the valence groups (t(49) = .41, p =
.69; 95% CI-.15-.23).
Discussion
The current study measured choice spread in value change in two conditions; before and after
a choice was made between stimuli. We found that choosing between two images before revalu-
ation resulted in a larger relative increase in valuation for the chosen option than making the
choice after the revaluation. This replicated findings showing that a significant portion of
choice-induced preference change is not a methodological artefact (see Izuma & Murayama [7]
for review).
Consistency of choice and valuation (choice spread independent of whether the choice was
made before or after revaluation) was higher when stimuli were of positive valence. This choice
consistency is not merely revaluation caused by the choice but also includes conforming the
choice to fluctuations in valuation. The fact that this effect was stronger for positive stimuli
shows a choice bias that is sensitive to stimulus valence. Additionally, the magnitude of the
choice-induced preference change was not modulated by action or valence per se, but by their
interaction. This effect was driven by changes across all conditions, including the control con-
dition. Schonberg at al. [14] showed that subsequent choice is biased after as little as eight repe-
titions of Go responses that coincided with item presentation. In this study we show that when
action is integrated into the choice both choice and valuation are affected. Note that action and
inaction choice trials happen once per item and merely differ by a single keypress obviating
any learning effect per se. A possible explanation for the effects that valence and action have on
choice and valuation involves a Pavlovian coupling of response tendencies (e.g. action/inac-
tion) with the valence of the outcome (e.g. choosing among overall positive or overall negative
outcomes) [15,22]. This is usually seen to arise out of a consequence that in natural environ-
ments action and reward tend to be closely aligned, i.e. approach for reward. Furthermore, a re-
cent study shows that devaluation of stimuli can be induced by stopping actions [23]. The
present study shows how this intrinsic coupling of action and valence affects forced choices
among similarly valued rewards and the dynamics of revaluation. In this regard the findings
add to an emerging picture that action expression in itself is relevant for valuation and behavior
[16,17,24–26]. A similar account could also explain the increased consistency of choice and val-
uation for items of positive valence. The fact that dynamic of revaluation is sensitive to stimu-
lus valence favours a Pavlovian congruence account over more non-specific biases, e.g.
attentional focus due to action. However, the factors of action and valence also modulate the
spread of value due to choice in the Session 2 Choice condition (see Fig. 2a). Effects in the Ses-
sion 1 Choice condition could be attributed to a change in revaluation caused by active or inac-
tive choice. Effects in the Session 2 Choice condition could be attributed to a drift in ratings
between session that interacts with active and inaction choice tendencies (for example the rela-
tively more positive value change in Session 2 Choice Go Unchosen may be due to the relatively
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action and valence on the dynamics of revaluation, i.e. the interaction of choice biasing valua-
tion and vice versa, remain to be established. A disposition towards viewing the outcomes of
active choices more favourably post choice may provide a basis for cognitive biases, e.g. the
aforementioned asymmetry in regret over committed or omitted action [27]. A role for action
rather than passive inaction may also underpin the omission bias in moral judgements. Here
omitting an action that causes harm is seen as more favourable than committing an action with
the same outcome. One possibility is this is related to an increased sense of causality and per-
sonal responsibility associated with overt actions [28]. Therefore, the effect of action on dy-
namics of choice-induced preference change is also consistent with accounts of preference
change focusing on self-perception (see [13,29] for discussions).
The results also demonstrate how choice can be biased towards action. The fact that choices
associated with action are preferred over choices associated with inaction suggests a possible
source for suboptimal decision making. Given that this bias is independent of valence it may
reflect a general action bias observed in instrumental learning under uncertainty [24,30–32].
This choice bias is especially interesting because it makes explanations of enhanced revaluation
due to effort [33,34] less plausible for the effect of action on the dynamics of choice-induced
preference change. If the key press was perceived as effortful one would expect subjects to be bi-
ased against pressing the key, as item values were closely matched. By contrast, a general bias
towards action could be explained by a higher hedonic value of action itself if inaction is per-
ceived as inhibition [35,36].
In conclusion, our findings indicate that actions are not only the expression of a decision
process but also impact on both revaluation and choice.
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